Difference between revisions of "IQue Player System Flaws"

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(*pops champagne*)
 
m (clarification with regard to SAs)
Line 29: Line 29:
 
If all 5 certificates verified correctly, the function will return success.
 
If all 5 certificates verified correctly, the function will return success.
 
| Assuming this function can be called with an attacker-controlled array of certificates, self-signing of certificates (and thus, arbitrary code execution, with full non-Secure Mode privileges)
 
| Assuming this function can be called with an attacker-controlled array of certificates, self-signing of certificates (and thus, arbitrary code execution, with full non-Secure Mode privileges)
 +
(This is not the case for Secure Applications, the code in SK for verifying those sets up a hardcoded array on the stack for the certificate verification function)
 
| April 2018
 
| April 2018
 
| [[User:Riley|Riley]]
 
| [[User:Riley|Riley]]

Revision as of 14:03, 25 April 2018

Hardware

Summary Description Timeframe this was discovered Discovered by
No known hardware exploits

Secure Kernel

Summary Description Successful exploitation result Timeframe this was discovered Discovered by
psychic paper: Secure Kernel could incorrectly consider a self-signed certificate chain as valid The function for verifying certificate chains at 0x9FC028BC is passed an array of pointers to certificates.

For the first 5 elements, it checks to see if the certificate was issued by Root, if so it checks if the certificate was signed by the hardcoded Root public key (and returns immediately with the result). If the certificate wasn't signed by Root, it checks if the certificate was signed by the public key of the next certificate in the array. If all 5 certificates verified correctly, the function will return success.

Assuming this function can be called with an attacker-controlled array of certificates, self-signing of certificates (and thus, arbitrary code execution, with full non-Secure Mode privileges)

(This is not the case for Secure Applications, the code in SK for verifying those sets up a hardcoded array on the stack for the certificate verification function)

April 2018 Riley

Secure Applications

Summary Description Successful exploitation result Exploitable Secure Applications Timeframe this was discovered Discovered by
No known Secure Application exploits